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BAIL: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE BOND-SETTING
BEHAVIOR OF HOLIDAY COURT JUDGES
IN CHICAGO*
The ultimate viability of our legal system depends upon its ability to
recognize its fallibility and correct its mistakes. Stability is an accepted goal
of social organization until it results in atrophy. At that point stability must
give way to change in order to insure a system responsive to the rights of
individuals who encounter that system.
In the case of bail, adherence to established practice has resulted in the
perpetuation of a system of injustice. The only way to eliminate this injus-
tice is to change the manner in which the bail right is administered. Over
the years many articles have been written1 and many studies have been con-
ducted2 with a view to revising the administration of bail in this country.
The attempts at reform3 have not been futile, 4 but changes have come about
rather slowly.5
The fllinois bail laws were revised more than ten years ago, but the im-
plementation of the reforms has fallen far short of the goals. This article
will present statistical data showing that holiday courts in Chicago" are nei-
* The author wishes to express appreciation to all of the people associated with
the Cook County Special Bail Project. This article could not have been written without
them. Special thanks is extended to Betty Schulte and Carol Leff, the present and
former directors of the Project, and Stephen A. Schiller for their individual assistance.
1. See, e.g., Conference on Bail and Indigency, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 1; Harris, Bail
-The Case For Reform, 124 NEW L.J. 124 (1974); Kamin, Bail Administration in Illi-
nois, 53 ILL. B.J. 674 (1965); Pound and Leahy, Bail Reform-The Search for Constitu-
tional Realism, 11 DUQUESNE L. REV. 14 (1972). See also notes 28 and 32 infra.
2. See, e.g., McCarthy and Wahl, The District of Columbia Bail Project: An
Illustration of Experimentation and a Brief For Change, 53 GEo. L.J. 675 (1965); Pines,
An Answer to the Problem of Bail: A Proposal In Need of Empirical Confirmation,
9 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 394 (1973); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964); Note, The Development of Release on Recognizance and
the Dane County Bail Study, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 156. See also notes 28 and 32 infra.
3. For an examination of one of the most comprehensive attempts at reform, see
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PRETRIAL RELEASE (Approved Draft, 1968). Illinois' compliance with these stand-
ards is discussed in S. SCHILLER, THE ABA STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ILLINOIS' COMPLIANCE (1974).
4. But see D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODE
§§ 23-1301 through 1332 (SuPP. IV. 1971). The Act provides for preventive detention,
which is considered by many to be a step backwards in the movement towards reform
of pretrial procedures. For a comprehensive analysis of the D.C. provisions, see Bor-
man, The Selling of Preventive Detention 1970, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 879 (1971). For a
discussion of preventive detention generally, see Hermann, Preventive Detention: A
Scientific View of Man and State Power, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 673.
5. It was not until 1963 that Illinois completely revised its bail laws. The federal
statute, the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 146-52 (1970), was not passed until 1966.
6. The holiday courts in Chicago are those of the First Municipal District of the
Circuit Court of Cook County. They are special courts set up to hear cases on Satur-
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ther acting in accordance with the policies expressed by the legislature, nor
in accordance with the requirements of due process, equal protection, and
the eighth amendment prohibition against excessive bail.
First, it will be established that there is a right to bail in Illinois prior
to conviction. Secondly, the ultimate purpose of bail will be shown to be
that of reasonably assuring the accused's appearance at trial.7 Thirdly, the
necessity of counsel at the bail hearing as a vital ingredient in securing the
defendant's constitutional rights will be pointed up. Finally, the procedures
available enabling the defendant to contest the bail decision will be pre-
sented.
DATAs
The data to be presented was obtained from the records of the Cook
County Special Bail Project. The Project is a not-for-profit organization in
which citizen volunteers attend holiday court sessions. Defendants in felony,
misdemeanor and women's court9 are interviewed before the bail hearing to
obtain information designed to help the judge in making a reasonable bail
decision. This information is verified by calling a family member.' 0
The Project also has some observers and an attorney present" during
days, Sundays and holidays. These are the only courts for which detailed information
on bond-setting behavior was available. It should be noted that there may be differences
in the bond-setting behavior of the weekday bail judges. The latter are full judges,
whereas the holiday court judges are associate judges, in many cases traffic court judges.
The holiday courts, however, unlike the weekday courts, do have ready access to verified
information concerning the accused's family and community ties. Other possible differ-
ences between the two courts will be noted throughout the text wherever applicable.
7. This article will focus on the right to bail before trial. The right to bail after
conviction, pending appeal, is not absolute. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-4 (1973).
The presumption of innocence no longer applies at this stage of the criminal process.
8. The data was obtained with the assistance of Stephen A. Schiller, J.D., Associ-
ate Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, presently
the executive director of the Chicago Crime Commission. Mr. Schiller has done statis-
tical research on bail and the criminal investigator. He recently completed a study on
Illinois' compliance with the ABA standards which is cited in note 3 supra.
9. Although the Bail Project does interview in women's court, complete data was
not available from this court. As a result, women's court figures are not included in
the analysis.
10. When called, the family member is not advised of the answers a defendant has
given but must give his or her own answers to the same questions the defendant has
answered. The answers are then compared to note any discrepancies. It has been ob-
served, however, that some defendants learn on the street what information will help
them to receive a low bond. Other defendants remember the procedure from previous
appearances in holiday court. Thus the verifying process is not foolproof. The judge
will be told by the Bail Project attorney whether the information is verified.
The family member contacted is also asked to come to court. Some judges give
weight to the presence of family members at the bail hearing, but an analysis of the
data obtained shows that that weight is minimized where the officer or complainant is
also present.
11. The Public Defender's office also sends one of its attorneys to the holiday
court bail hearing. Less than two percent of the defendants in the sample were repre-
sented by their own counsel.
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the bail hearing. The attorney tries to persuade the judge to use the infor-
mation obtained by the volunteers who have interviewed the defendants.
The Project believes that by using the information they have obtained, the
judge can make a more reasonable and just decision at the bail hearing. The
observers record the bail decision with the information that has been pre-
sented to the judge. The recorded information provides the basis for the
statistical data that is analyzed in this article.12
RIGHT To AND PURPOSE OF BAIL
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits ex-
cessive bail but does not provide an absolute right to bail.13  The Illinois
Constitution 14 provides an absolute right to bail before conviction with one
exception. This exception involves capital offenses (those in which death is
a possible punishment), where the proof is evident or the presumption great
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. The Illinois bail statute
was similarly worded until 1973, when, in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Furman v. Georgia,15 the legislature amended the statute. The
bail statute as amended provides an absolute right -to bail except when the
offense charged is murder, aggravated kidnapping or treason and -the proof
is evident or the presumption great that the accused is guilty.1 6 If charged
12. The sample consisted of 1,000 cases, all adult males (see note 9 supra), chosen
randomly from the observation sheets. The period covered is from May 1, 1972, to
April 31, 1973 (where information from other periods is available that fact will be
noted). The population for this period was determined from the statistical records kept
by the Bail Project showing the number of defendants who appeared at each session.
The observation sheet total did not equal this amount, however. Twenty three percent
of the cases-3,892 out of 16,671-were missing. Observers' reports of these cases were
either mislaid or non-existent. The first sample that was chosen was meaningless be-
cause many observers had failed to take down relevant information. The sample popula-
tion was therefore limited to those observation sheets prepared by conscientious observ-
ers. Four observers were chosen from felony and four from misdemeanor court, with
the help of the then director of the Bail Project, Carol Leff. This resulted in more miss-
ing cases-11,739 or sixty nine percent of the total population. A respective proportion
of felony and misdemeanor cases (determined from the population total of 16,671) was
chosen randomly from the remaining cases.
The statistical work was done with the help of a computer. M x N tables are pre-
sented along with frequencies. A chi square (a measure of significance) could not be
computed in any cases because of the presence of empty cells.
Certain percentages were adjusted for purposes of this paper to exclude the dis-
missed cases from the computations. These cases do not involve a bail decision. They
are usually minor city charges-cases in which the defendants were not interviewed by
the Bail Project-although sometimes they were given legal representation.
13. The eighth amendment states that excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. For a general discus-
sion of the history behind its adoption, see Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in
Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965).
14. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman made unconstitutional those death penalty pro-
visions which were capable of being discriminatorily applied,
16. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, § 110-4 (1973).
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with one of these offenses, the accused has the burden of showing that he
should be admitted to bail.1 7
Illinois courts have long recognized the right to bail before conviction
under the Illinois Constitution and statute.18 As early as 1904, the Illinois
Appellate Court indicated the position that the right to bail has assumed in
our legal system. "The right to release upon bail is so firmly grounded in
our system of jurisprudence . . .that one accused of crime, whether guilty
or innocent, cannot be deprived of the right with impunity."'
19
The ultimate purpose of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused
at trial.20  The interests of both the accused and the state have been bal-
anced in determining the purpose of bail. The interest of the accused is rep-
resented by the principle underlying the granting of bail-the presumption
that an accused is innocent until proven guilty at trial. 21 The state's interest
is having the accused appear for trial. 22 Where the state fails to prove that
the accused will not appear as required, the accused should be granted bail
in the absence of extreme circumstances.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND POLICY
The Bail Article of 1963 contained four major innovations:23 release
on recognizance (ROR) was instituted;24 failure to appear on ROR as a sep-
17. In People v. Anthony, 55 Ill. 2d 222 (1974), the Illinois Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether the abolition of the death penalty made bailable ev-
ery criminal offense. In that case the defendant was indicted for aggravated battery,
aggravated kidnapping, attempted murder, armed robbery and armed violence. The ap-
pellate court had reversed the order of the lower court denying bail, on the ground that
the defendant was not charged with a capital offense and thus was entitled to bail un-
der the Illinois Constitution. The state was granted leave to appeal. Because the de-
fendant had already been tried, convicted and sentenced, the court considered the issue
moot. The court vacated the order of the appellate court, however, "since its effect was
to hold unconstitutional section 110-4(a), a question upon which we express no opin-
ion." Id. at 223. The court also noted that since new legislation again provides for
the death penalty in certain specified categories of murder, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
1005-8-lA (1973), the problem will not have to be considered.
18. See People ex rel. Smith v. Blaylock, 357 11. 23, 191 N.E. 206 (1934); People
ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 11. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930); Markey v. Griffin, 109 Ill.
App. 212 (1904).
19. Markey v. Griffin, 109 Ill. App. 212, 221 (1904).
20. Committee Comments, S.H.A. ch. 38, § 110 (1971). Accord, Stack v. Boyle,
432 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
21. People ex rel. Gendron v. Ingram, 34 Ill. 2d 623, 625, 217 N.E.2d 803 (1966).
22. Id. at 625, 217 N.E.2d at 803.
23. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110 (1973). For further analysis of the Bail Article,
see Board of Student Editors, The Administration of Illinois Bail Provisions: An Em-
pirical Study of Four Downstate Illinois Counties, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 341. The study
showed recognizance bonds set in eleven percent of the felony cases and twenty-one per-
cent of the misdemeanor cases during the period January 1, 1969, to June 30, 1969.
These findings are comparable to those shown in Table 1, infra, in that the holiday
courts analyzed in this article also gave twice as many ROR bonds in misdemeanor
cases.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1973). The statute says that an accused may
be released on his own recognizance, but the section also limits the court's discretion
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arate criminal offense was initiated;2 5 posting of ten percent of the face of
the bond was established;26 and guidelines to the courts for determining the
amount of bail were presented.27  The reasons for these changes can be
found in the comments of the committee that drafted the article.
The committee took a realistic approach in drafting the article, based
upon many factual studies28 and what it recognized as -the ultimate purpose
of bail-to assure the accused's presence at trial. 29 It discovered that finan-
cial loss was no real deterrent in most cases, 0 and expressed concern over
the anomaly of requiring a money bond from an indigent. Acknowledging
that other factors s' are relevant to assuring the presence of the accused at
trial,32 the drafters arrived at the conclusion that most persons have every
intention of appearing for trial and should be released on their own recog-
nizance rather than being required to post a money bond. For those cases
where the court decided that financial loss would be necessary as a deterrent,
a money bond was suggested, but the loss was to be minimized in the case
of a person who appears for trial.3 8 The express purpose was to rely upon
by stating that this shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of relying upon
criminal sanctions.
25. Id. The offense was made subject to the penalty provided in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 32-10 (1973).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (1973). For example, if the bond set is $250,
the defendant need only post $25. The section, however, provides that no less than $25
be posted. When the conditions of the bond have been performed and the defendant
has been discharged from all obligations in the cause, the defendant receives back ninety
percent of the amount posted.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-5 (1973). These guidelines are set forth at note
38 infra and accompanying text.
28. The committee considered the following studies: Aries and Sturz, Bail and the
Indigent Accused, 8 CRIME AND DEL. 12 (1962); Note, Compelling Appearance in
Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954); Note,
A Study of the Administration of Bail in NYC, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693 (1958); The
Proposed Bail Bond Bill, 25 TEx. B.J. 11 (1962). See Committee Comments, S.H.A.
ch. 38, § 110 (1971).
29. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
30. Where a bondsman was used, the accused lost his money regardless of whether
he appeared. Where a bondsman was not used, it was his family and friends, not the
accused personally, who suffered the loss in most of the cases.
31. These other factors are the community and family ties of the accused. They
are discussed in more detail at note 53 infra and accompanying text.
32. The committee considered the work of the Vera Institute of Justice's Manhat-
tan Bail Project, discussed by Aries and Sturz in Bail and the Indigent Accused, supra
note 28. For further discussion of the Project and its results, see Aries, Rankin and
Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole,
38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67 (1963); Botein, The Manhattan Bail Project: Its Impact on
Criminology and the Criminal LaIv Processes, 13 TEx. L. REv. 319 (1965). During
the three years the Project was in operation 3,505 defendants were released on their
own recognizance. Only 56, 1.6%, failed to appear. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PRO-
GRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE TEN YEAR INTERIM
REPORT 1961-1971 at 35 (1972).
33. The loss that the legislature speaks of is apparently the loss of the use of the
money required by the money bond, along with the one percent court cost that is re-
tit.ied. See note 26 supra,
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criminal sanctions rather than financial loss to assure the appearance of the
accused at trial.34
. GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING BAIL
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits ex-
cessive bail. This prohibition is binding on the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 35  Although the point at which bail becomes excessive is not
easily ascertained, the courts have set forth certain minimal requirements that
must be met in order for the bail to be permissible under the eighth amend-
ment. The accused must be released on the least restrictive conditions.86
"Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill
this purpose [to assure the appearance of the accused] is 'excessive' under
the eighth amendment."37
The Illinois statute also provides certain minimal standards that the
courts must adhere to in making the bail decision.3 The financial ability
of the accused must be taken into account. The bail set must be sufficient
to assure compliance with the conditions set forth in the bond,39 but it should
not be oppressive. It should reflect the offense charged, as well as the past
criminal acts and conduct of the accused. 40
The crux of this section appears to be the "not oppressive" clause. No
court has attempted to define what is meant by the words "not oppressive,"
but it seems reasonable to assume that through this clause the legislature in-
tended to adopt the prohibition contained in the eighth amendment. In ordi-
nary usage, the word "oppressive" encompasses the term "excessive." If the
bail that is set is excessive, it is also oppressive.
A clearer understanding of the meaning of the term "not oppressive"
can be acquired by reading the clause in connection with the inequity the
1963 Bail Article was designed to eliminate. The legislature revised the bail
laws to abolish a system which resulted in the setting of unjust and oppres-
sive bonds. The inequity the legislature sought to eliminate was the require-
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1973).
35. Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965
(1964); People ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
36. United States v. Cowper, 349 F. Supp. 560, 562 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
37. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
38. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-5 (1973). Although the section is entitled
"guidelines for determining the amount of bail," a reading of the provisions in connec-
tion with the comments of the drafting committee suggests that the legislature intended
the section to apply to ROR bonds as well as money bonds. Section 110-2 on recog-
nizance merely states, "when from all the circumstances..... " a clause broad enough
to include the provisions of section 110-5 in addition to other information about the ac-
cused.
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-10 (1973) provides that the conditions of the
bond shall be that the accused will: 1) appear to answer the' charges against him; 2)
submit to the orders and processes of the court; 3) not depart the state without leave
and; 4) such other reasonable conditions as the court may impose.
40. Justice Jackson, concurring in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 10 (1951), stated
that "misdeeds or a bad record should prejudice only those who are guilty of them."
This suggests that only prior convictions should be considered in this regard.
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ment of a bond in excess of that which was necessary to assure the accused's
presence at trial. As a result, the legislature proclaimed that financial loss
was not to be required unless it was needed to deter bail jumping, and if
necessary, financial loss was to be minimized in the case of a person who
appears for trial. 1 Where the bond set is not commensurate with assuring
the accused's presence at trial, it is oppressive. 42
ROR BONDS 43
The previous discussion has indicated that the legislature expressed its
intention that the great majority of persons be released on their own recog-
nizance. Table 1 suggests that this policy is far from being effectuated.
Even the most recent figures do not show release on recognizance in a major-
ity of the cases. Rather, ROR bonds are given in less than one-third of all
the cases. In felony cases, the disparity is much greater.
TABLE 1
ADJUSTED PERCENTAGE4 4 OF ROR BONDS SET IN HOLIDAY COURT
4 5
Court May, 1972-April, 1973 July-Dec., 1973 Jan.-June, 1974
Misdemeanor 25.9 30.2 31.5
Felony 13.4 14.3 15.1
Average 20.0 22.3 23.3
The data presented in this table suggests that some judges are abusing
41. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
42. Since they mean essentially the same thing, "excessive" and "oppressive" will
be used interchangeably in the text. The use of one is meant to imply the application
of the other.
43. In practice, the courts give Individual (I) bonds rather than ROR bonds. In
the case of an I bond, unlike an ROR bond, a monetary amount is set, although the
defendant posts no cash. Usual practice is not to enter judgment for the amount if for-
feited. The text speaks in terms of ROR bonds to avoid confusion when speaking of
the bail statute.
44. The percentages were adjusted to exclude minor city cases, which are customar-
ily dismissed by the court. See note 12 supra.
45. Figures obtained from Judge Peter Bakakos, Chief Judge of the Surety Divi-
sion, indicate that there were even fewer ROR bonds set in weekday courts during 1972
and 1973 (figures for 1974 were not available). In Chicago in 1972 only 19.2% of
the 109,511 bonds posted were ROR bonds (The total number of bonds posted includes
ROR bonds and ten percent bonds. The total consists of the figures for holiday court,
weekday courts and police stations considered together). In 1973, 22.7% of the 107,722
bonds posted were ROR bonds. The percentage for the county as a whole (suburban
districts included) is even lower. In 1972, only 18.9% of the 143,927 bonds posted
were ROR bonds. In 1973, 21.1% of the 150,869 bonds posted were ROR bonds.
When one adds to the total number of bonds posted those cases where the defendant
was unable to post the ten percent (this would amount to the total number of bonds
set), the percentage of ROR bonds will be even lower.
A pilot project undertaken by the former Assistant Director of the Bail Project, Jon
Moore, in the fall of 1973, showed that only 5 percent of the 168 defendants observed
in Branch 24 (a weekday felony court) received ROR bonds. For an explanation of
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their discretion in setting bail. Although the bail that is set may be "within
the limits'" 46 prescribed by the legislature, the court abuses its discretion if
it clearly appears that the type as well as the amount of the bail set consti-
tutes a substantial departure from the fundamental law and its spirit and pur-
pose.47 Setting ROR bonds in less than one-third of the cases is a seemingly
substantial departure from the purpose of relying upon criminal sanctions in-
stead of financial loss, and releasing a great majority of defendants on their
own recognizance. Yet the following table shows that during the period May,
1972, through April, 1973, seventy-four percent (23 out of 31) of the judges
set ROR bonds for less than thirty percent of the defendants. The recent
figures indicate that some of the judges are giving even fewer ROR bonds
than before. A few are giving more ROR bonds, but in most cases the in-
crease does not appear to be significant.
TABLE 2
ADJUSTED PERCENTAGE OF ROR BONDS GIVEN BY INDIVIDUAL
JUDGES IN HOLIDAY COURT
JUDGE
% ROR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
March-April
1972-1973 14.3 33.8 4.8 0.0 36.4 9.1 7.1 14.3
Jan.-June 32.6B* 1.7F 25.1B 38.4B 11.9F
1974 (31.8F** (OAF (15.8F
35.9M***) 42.3M) 62.9M)
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1972-1973 41.6 43.8 23.3 17.2 26.9 12.5 0.0 68.4
1974 38.7B 16.7B 18.4B 0.OF
(4.IF (4.9F (11.7F
51.3M) 31.6M) 35.9M)
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1972-1973 40.0 27.2 17.2 13.5 16.6 0.0 18.1 3.8
1974 22.7M 21.7F 35.6B
(28.6F
45.3M)
25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1972-1973 10.0 20.0 12.1 11.5 47.8 40.0 25.0
1974 16.2B 21.7F 39.1M 6.1F(12.5F
23.2M)
*B means both felony and misdemeanor considered together
**F means felony
***M means misdemeanor 4S
these results, see note 56 infra. For an examination of the number of ROR bonds set
from 1963 to 1972, see Smith and Reilley, The Illinois Bail System: A Second Look,
6 JOHN MARSH. J. 33 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Smith and Reilley].
46. Within the limits in the sense that the court, after considering the surrounding
circumstances, may choose whether to set an ROR bond or a money bond.
47. Cf. People v. Miller, 33 Ill. 2d 439, 444, 211 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1965), where
the defendant argued that the court abused its discretion in sentencing.
48. It is undetermined for 1972 to 1973 which, or both, courts the judge was sitting
in; accordingly, it is to be considered a "B".
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When an accused is interviewed by the Bail Project, one would assume
that the judge would be more likely to give an ROR bond, since he is more
likely in such circumstances to have verified information regarding the ac-
cused. The following table indicates that at least ten (a third) of the judges
do take the Bail Project seriously. These judges give more ROR bonds when
an accused is interviewed by the Bail Project. The remaining judges, how-
ever, seem to give no credence to the Bail Project-an apparent violation
of due process as well as legislative intent.49
TABLE 3
ADJUSTED PERCENTAGE OF ROR BONDS WHERE BP
INTERVIEW V. No BP INTERVIEW
HOLIDAY COURT, MAY, 1972, TO APRIL, 1973
JUDGE
% ROR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Yes BP 0.0 30.0 11.1 No 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 60.0
No BP 13.0 31.7 0.0 Data 0.0 14.3 10.0 8.3 0.4 30.0
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Yes BP 30.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 37.5 44.4 33.3 0.0
No BP 10.0 19.1 30.0 18.8 0.0 62.5 43.8 0.0 0.0 8.0
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Yes BP 18.2 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 12.5 20.0 0.0 11.1 25.0 25.0
No BP 15.4 0.0 22.2 0.0 11.1 28.6 9.1 10.5 77.8 66.7 25.0
MONEY BONDS
For those cases where it is necessary for the court to set a money bond,
where financial loss is necessary as a deterrent, 50 the committee expressed
the policy that such loss be minimized in the case of a person who appears
for trial. To reiterate, criminal sanctions are to be relied upon rather than
financial loss.
The following table shows the highest, lowest and average money bond
set by each judge from May, 1972, through April, 1973. The money bonds
that were set appear reasonable, when one considers that in fact the defend-
ant will, in most cases, be posting ten percent of the amount set.51 Upon
further reflection, however, the money bonds do not appear to be as reason.
49. Due process prohibits bias on the part of the decision maker, wilfull misappli-
cation of statutory standards [Grady v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 346 F. Supp. 681, 683
(N.D. Ia. 1972)], and arbitrary administration of the right to bail [United States ex rel.
Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784, 786 (N.D. 111. 1970)].
50. It should be reiterated here that the committee felt financial loss is not neces-
sary in most cases. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
51. A defendant who has the means may, in lieu of the ten percent, post a suffi-
cient amount of security. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-8 (1973).
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able as first impressions would imply. Subsequent analysis indicates that
many of these persons did not need to suffer financial loss and should have
received ROR Bonds. For those who are indigent, even fifty dollars is diffi-
cult to raise.
TABLE 4
MONEY BONDS SET FROM MARCH, 1972, TO APRIL, 1973
IN HOLIDAY COURT
JUDGE
Amt. Set 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Highest 5,000 10,000 2,500 15,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 1,000 3,000
Lowest 250 250 250 500 1,000 250 500 250 250
Average 1,187 2,426 822 3,000 6,000 2,900 3,077 667 1,105
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Highest 3,000 15,000 10,000 1,500 25,000 10,000 1,000 5,000
Lowest 1,000 500 100 100 250 250 500 500
Average 1,667 2,344 1,577 718 5,786 3,146 667 1,733
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Highest 20,000 10,000 7,500 5,000 10,000 7,500 25,000 1,500
Lowest 500 500 500 250 1,000 500 1,000 250
Average 3,156 3,208 2,391 1,263 6,636 2,722 4,940 806
26 27 28 29 30 31
Highest 11,000 75,000 50,000 3,000 25,000 15,000
Lowest 250 250 250 250 1,500 500
Average 4,104 6,442 5,687 1,146 7,250 5,944
Perhaps there is a reasonable explanation for the continued reliance upon
financial loss as a deterrent. It is possible that the assumptions made by
the legislature to arrive at the conclusion that most persons do not need to
suffer financial loss and will appear for trial are not borne out in the cases
of the defendants appearing before these courts. It becomes necessary, then,
to examine the information available to the court in making these determina-
tions. Through such an examination it will be possible to determine whether
financial loss is, in fact, necessary to assure the accused's presence at trial.
WHETHER FINANCIAL Loss Is NECESSARY AS A DETERRENT
For financial loss to be unnecessary, there would have to be other infor-
mation about the accused indicating that he would appear. Studies have
shown, as the legislature has acknowledged,52 that where an accused has
strong family and community ties, 53 there is sufficient deterrent to bail jump-
ing so as to make financial loss unnecessary. 54 The following table shows
52. Supra note 32.
53. Community and family ties include the characteristics set forth in Table 5 in-
fra.
54. It should be noted that in many cases bail jumping may be just technical. For
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that the defendants as a whole, when questioned, appeared to have very
strong community and family ties.
TABLE 5
FAMILY AND COMMUNITY TIES
HOLIDAY COURT, MAY, 1972 TO APRIL, 1973
Characteristic Findings (in percentages) Percentage of times known55
Family Ties 91.2 lived with family or relatives 75.8
Employment 77.1 presently employed or in last six months 64.8
School 92.5 in school 68.9
Residence 96.7 at present or prior address for one year 46.9
Time in Chgo. 84.6 in Chgo. for more than 5 yrs. 78.0
Age 81.9 under 24 years of age 76.4
One could conclude from this information that financial loss appears to
be unnecessary in seventy-five percent of the cases. 56 The data does, then,
bear out the assumptions made by the legislature that the great majority of
persons do not require financial loss as a deterrent. And yet, as has been
shown previously in Table 1, less than one-fourth of those persons received
ROR bonds. It would, therefore, appear that in as many as fifty percent
of the cases the defendants received an oppressive bond.
In most cases there was no indication that the accused would not ap-
pear. In fifty-eight percent of the cases the accused's prior record consisted
of two misdemeanors or less. Fifty percent had no prior record at all. 57 No
more than fifteen percent showed any indication of prior bond forfeiture.58
example, the accused may have a problem relating to a firm schedule, or he may be
unable to determine where he is required to appear.
55. This indicates the number of times the information was heard and recorded
by the observer. Note, in relation to the findings: the 91.2% for family ties means
91.2% of those cases where the question was asked, only 28.9% of the total sample. See
Table 7 infra.
56. This is an inference based on the percentages of findings in Table 5, none of
which is lower than 77%. A defendant profile for Branch 24 (a weekday felony court,
see note 45 supra) suggests that financial loss may be necessary as a deterrent more
often for the defendants appearing in that court. The average defendant there is older,
more likely to be unemployed, and moves more frequently than the defendants in holi-
day court. The observation made by individuals with experience in Branch 24 is that
this court deals with major felonies and handles individuals with longer criminal records
and less stability in the community. The crimes are more likely to be committed by
design.
57. No prior record means no record of convictions. See note 40 supra and ac-
companying text.
58. The percentage of defendants with a history of bond forfeiture is probably even
lower than 15%. The 15% figure also includes those having a prior record of three
felonies or more, not necessarily bond forfeitures. Figures on forfeiture rates prior to
1972 are presented by Smith and Reilley, supra note 45 at 41. From 1964 to 1966 the
forfeiture rate rose from seven percent to twenty percent for ROR bonds while the for-
feiture rate for ten percent bonds only rose from seven percent to eleven percent for
the First Municipal District. The figures reported for 1969 to 1971 are for the First
Municipal District for ten percent bonds (from 13.5 percent to 13.3 percent), and for
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Evaluating the money bonds set by the courts (Table 4) in light of this in-
formation, it appears that many of the money bonds that were set were also
oppressive. In at least fifty percent of the cases it appeared that the accused
would have shown up for trial.
INDIGENTS
One group that appears to be particularly discriminated against is the
indigents. As previous discussion indicates, one of the main reasons for re-
vising the Bail Article was to eliminate the anomalous requirement of a
money bond from an indigent. The following table suggests that the courts
are not acting in accordance with this policy.
TABLE 6
BONDS SET WHILE CONTROLLING FOR FINANCIAL ABILITY
HOLIDAY COURT, MAY, 1972 TO APRIL, 1973
Bond
Financial Dis-
Ability missed ROR $100 $250 $300 $500 $750 $1000 $1500
No 4.8 4.8 0.0 4.8 0.0 23.8 0.0 14.3 4.8
Yes 0.0 3.6 1.2 2.4 1.2 25.0 3.6 32.1 7.1
$2000 $2500 $3000 $4000 $5000 $7500 $10000 $20000
No 14.3 9.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 0.0 4.8 0.0
Yes 6.0 3.6 3.6 1.2 2.4 1.2 4.8 1.2
TOTAL NO 21
YES 84
105
Although those found by the court to be financially unable to post bond
received more ROR bonds than those who were able to post bond, the num-
ber of ROR bonds set appears to be insignificant. It has been shown in
Table 5 that the defendants as a whole had strong family and community
ties. Based upon this finding, it was concluded that financial loss was ap-
parently unnecessary in a great majority of the cases. Yet the table shows
that only 4.8 percent of the indigent defendants received an ROR bond.
Overall, the indigent defendants appear to have received higher money bonds
than those who were not indigent. This table suggests that some judges pur-
posely set an excessive bail in order to keep the defendant in jail-a violation
of legislative policy as well as the eighth amendment.
the county as a whole for ROR bonds (from 21.8 to 31.4 to 22.6 percent). Based on
information obtained from the Clerk's office, the Bail Project has determined that from
1969 to 1972 the forfeiture rate for ROR bonds increased only 11.5% while the rate
for monetary bonds increased 13.3%, for the First Municipal District, Cook County
(weekday and holiday court both included). Hyde, CCSBP Statistical Report Prepared
For the Board of Directors, December, 1973 (unpublished report).
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In addition to resulting in excessive bonds, the requirement of a money
bond from an indigent also conflicts with the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In Bandy v. United States,59 Justice Douglas, as Cir-
cuit Justice, noted that the ability to advance a sum of money in order to
secure release raises serious problems for equal administration of the law.
Subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court indicate that detention solely
because of inability to pay constitutes a violation of equal protection.60 If
an indigent defendant does not need to suffer financial loss to assure his ap-
pearance at trial, there is no reason for his detention other than his inability
to pay.
THE BAIL HEARING
The analysis of the bail decisions made by the courts has indicated that
many defendants received an excessive bond. The reason that excessive
bonds are being set is that the court in most cases fails to make the deter-
mination of whether financial loss is necessary to assure the accused's pres-
ence at trial. Although no case on point could be found, the failure to make
this determination would appear to be a violation of equal protection on the
part of the court. Classifications based on criteria wholly unrelated to the
objective of the statute have been held to violate equal protection guaran-
tees. 61 Although a statute may be fair on its face it may be administered
in an invidious way so as to violate equal protection.6 2 If a money bond
is set where financial loss is unnecessary, there is no rational connection be-
tween the objective of the statute or the purpose of bail and requiring the
accused to post a money bond-a violation of even the traditional test of
equal protection." Justice Douglas in his dissent in Schilb v. Kubel64 noted:
"The record is silent as to how the system of release on personal recognizance
as contrasted to release on ten percent is, in fact, administered. The man-
ner of administration may, of course, raise serious equal protection ques-
tions." 65 The following table indicates that the court rarely uses any infor-
mation other than the prior record of the accused.
59. 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960).
60. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that a defendant could not
be imprisoned for inability to pay a fine for a traffic offense punishable by fine only);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that a defendant could not be impris-
oned beyond the maximum sentence permitted by statute because of inability to pay the
attendant fine); United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding defend-
ant entitled to credit for pre-sentence custody because of inability to post the bond set).
61. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971).
62. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
63. The discussion in the text deals with the traditional test of equal protection.
The other test, the fundamental rights test, requires that the state justify discrimination
in regards to fundamental rights by a showing of a compelling interest. A discussion
of the differences between the two tests is provided in Schilb v. Kubel, 404 U.S. 357
(1971).
64. 404 U.S. 357 (1971). In Schilb the Court held that the one percent court cost
provision of Section 110-7 of the Illinois Bail Article was not a violation of equal pro-
tection.
65. Id. at 379.
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TABLE 7
AMOUNT OF INFORMATION USED BY HOLIDAY COURTS
MAY, 1972, TO APRIL, 1973
Characteristic
Prior Record
Employment
Residence
Financial Ability
Adjusted Percentage
of Times Used
66.066
32.5
15.7
17.1
Characteristic
Family Ties
School
Time in Chicago
Age
Adjusted Percentage
of Times Used
28.9
7.0
12.0
24.5
JUDGE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Avg. Amt.
Used67  .5 2.0 1.1 4.1 3.9 3.0 2.3 1.0 1.1 2.4
% Times None
Used 44 15 25 0 0 4 0 39 33 6
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Avg. Amt.
Used 2.1 3.7 1.9 3.6 1.8 .9 1.3 1.0 2.1 1.2
% Times None
Used 19 8 23 0 12 47 29 37 27 27
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Avg. Amt.
Used 1.7 .7 3.1 1.4 1.0 3.3 2.1 1.2 1.4 .8 1.4
% Times None
Used 25 46 8 23 60 0 13 52 21 46 0
In addition to the prior record of the accused, the nature of the offense
and its possible penalty also weigh heavily in the judge's decision. Twice
as many ROR bonds were given in misdemeanor cases, as indicated in Table
1. The bond set was $1,000 or less in 72.7 percent of the misdemeanor
cases, as compared to only 40.7 percent of the felony cases. The bond set
was above $2,000 in 51.9 percent of the felony cases, as compared to only
16.5 percent of the misdemeanor cases. There was a positive correlation be-
tween the maximum penalty and the bond set.68
Although it is necessary and proper for the court to consider these fac-
tors,6 9 it is equally important that the court hear evidence of the defendant's
66. It is probable that the percentage is even higher, because the judge usually has
the record before him and questions the accused in certain cases to test him.
67. Note: the figure shown is an average frequency, not a percentage. The high-
est possible amount is 8, each "one" representing one of the characteristics presented
in the first half of the table. For example, a judge who has an average of "1" usually
considered only one piece of information, probably the prior record of the accused.
68. Those who have attended holiday court sessions have observed that the judges
also give much weight to the state's recommendations.
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-5 (1973). Accord, People ex rel. Sammons v.
Snow, 340 Ill. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930).
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community and family ties. If the court does not consider this evidence, it
is unable to determine whether financial loss is necessary to assure the ac-
cused's presence at trial. Not having made that determination, the court in
many cases sets excessive bonds. Had the court considered community and
family ties, it could have released more defendants on their own recogni-
zance. The court also would have discovered that many of the defendants
who were required to post a money bond were entitled to lower money bonds.
This suggests that defendants are being denied their right to a "meaningful"
hearing as required by due process.
It is well settled that one of the basic requirements of due process is
that the accused be afforded an opportunity to be heard.70 This require-
ment is not satisfied if the accused is merely given a chance to speak at some
point in time. In addition to requiring that the accused be given an oppor-
tunity to be heard, due process also requires that the opportunity to be heard
be had at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 71 In order to
insure that the defendant is given a chance to be heard at a meaningful time,
it is necessary, in the absence of a compelling state interest, that the defend-
ant be heard before any deprivation takes place. In the case of bail, this
means that the defendant must be heard before bail is set by a judicial
officer. 72 The manner by which the defendant must be heard depends on
the type as well as the extent of the deprivation. In certain cases the de-
fendant must be given a hearing to insure that he is heard in a meaningful
manner. Bail is one of those cases. 73
Two recent federal cases have indicated the type of hearing that due
process requires. In Ackies v. Purdy,7 4 where bail was being set pursuant
to a master bond schedule according to the offense charged, the court held
that the lists themselves violated due process because the defendants were
deprived of their opportunity to be heard as required by due process. The
court issued a writ of mandamus prohibiting their use. The court then or-
dered that upon being booked, the defendant be given his "bail warnings";
1) that he had a right to a hearing before a judicial officer; 2) that bond
would be set on consideration of his past record, community and family ties,
employment and the offense charged; 75 3) that he would be presented with-
70. Chicago v. Cohn, 326 Ill. 372, 374, 158 N.E. 118, 120 (1927).
71. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
72. See Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38, 41 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
73. Id. Although Illinois statutory law does not expressly provide that a defendant
be given a hearing on the issue of bail, such a requirement is implicit in the provision
that the defendant be brought without unnecessary delay before the nearest magistrate.
See Committee Comments, S.H.A. ch. 38, § 109-1 (1971).
74. 322 F. Supp. 38, 41 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
75. It is unclear whether the court based this conclusion on due process, the Flor-
ida statute, or both. The case as a whole suggests that the court was basing its conclu-
sion on due process, in that the court's discussion focused on the requirements of a due
process hearing. Prior to its holding, in an earlier part of the opinion, the court makes
a statement to the effect that Florida statutory law required these characteristics to be
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out unnecessary delay; 4) that he may waive this right to a hearing.78
In Reddy v. Snepp,77 the unchecked testimony of a police officer, which
consisted of hearsay, was held to be inadmissible at the bail hearing. Such
testimony is admissible only when the name of the informant is disclosed and
the accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness and offer
evidence of rebuttal in his own behalf. 78
These two cases indicate that a defendant must be afforded a full, ad-
versary hearing on the issue of bail. Evidence is not to be used against an ac-
cused unless he is given the opportunity to rebut it. In order to be able
to effectively rebut any damaging evidence that has been introduced against
him, the accused must be allowed to present evidence on his own behalf. If
there has been adverse testimony by a state witness, he must also be given
the opportunity to cross-examine that witness.
As indicated earlier, the holiday courts rarely use any information other
than the nature of the offense, its possible penalty, and the prior record of
the accused when determining bail. 79 In those cases where the court refused
to consider other information, the accused's due process rights were violated.
If the defendant has strong community and family ties he must be allowed
to introduce evidence of that fact. Without such evidence, the issue of bail
is decided on the state's evidence alone, and the accused is denied his right
to be heard.
Besides being deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the de-
fendant may be prejudiced in other ways. If he is unable to make bond
and is jailed, he may be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to prepare
for trial. Whether or not the accused is released pending trial may also have
an effect on the verdict and sentence he receives. A study has shown that
those who are imprisoned are less likely to receive a suspended sentence than
those who are out on bond.8 0 Those who are imprisoned are also more likely
considered. Id. at 41. An analysis of Florida law in effect at that time does not support
the court's statement. The Florida parole and probation commission would present a
finding only on request of the court. See FLA. STAT. ch. 903, § 03 (1972).
76. The waiver must be both knowing and uncoerced. The defendant must be
aware of the consequences and understand that he is foresaking a constitutional right.
Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38, 42 (S.D. Fla. 1970), citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938).
77. 357 F. Supp. 999 (W.D.N.C. 1973). But see Bates v. Ogata, 52 Haw. 573,
482 P.2d 1.53 (1971) (holding the question one to be considered on a case by case ba-
sis).
78. But see Gernstein v. Pugh, 43 U.S.L.W. 4230 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975), where the
Supreme Court recently suggested by way of dicta that adversary safeguards are not re-
quired at the bail hearing. The case is discussed further in note 85 infra.
79. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
80. D.C. BAR AsSOCIATION, BAIL SYSTEM OF THE DIsTur OF COLUMBIA (1963).
Subsequent research indicates the correlation exists independent of such factors as prior
record and employment stability. Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39
N.y:U.L* R v 641 (1964).
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to be convicted and more likely to receive longer prison sentences than those
who are out on bond.81
Given the fact that the defendant may be deprived of a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard, one would assume that it is necessary that the defend-
ant be assisted by counsel at the bail hearing. When this argument was pre-
sented to a court in Maryland, however, the court held that counsel is not
required at this stage of the criminal process.8 2 In Coleman v. Alabama,83
the Supreme Court expressed a different view, although it did not deal di-
rectly with the issue. In that case the Court held that the Alabama prelimi-
nary hearing was a critical stage at which the accused is entitled to counsel.
One of the reasons given in support of that holding was that counsel would
be influential in making effective arguments on matters such as bail.8 4 In
pointing out the importance of counsel where a bail decision is involved, the
Supreme Court suggested that the bail hearing is a critical stage of the crim-
inal process, such that counsel is needed. This conclusion is supported by
the decisions in Ackies v. Purdy and Reddy v. Snepp. A full, adversary
hearing, as contemplated by those cases, is inconceivable without the pres-
ence of counsel.8 5
81. Legal Aid Society of the City of New York, The Unconstitutional Administra-
tion of Bail: Bellamy v. The Judges of New York City, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 459 (1972).
82. Hebron v. State, 13 Md. App. 134, 281 A.2d 547 (1971).
83. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Concluding the Illinois procedure was essentially the same
as that involved in Coleman, the Illinois Supreme Court held the Coleman decision ap-
plicable to Illinois in People v. Adams, 46 Ill. 2d 200, 263 N.E.2d 490 (1970), affd.,
405 U.S. 278 (1972).
84. 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
85. The Supreme Court recently suggested that the bail hearing is not a critical
stage of the criminal process such that counsel is needed. In Gernstein v. Pugh, 43
U.S.L.W. 4230 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975), after holding that the fourth amendment requires
a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on lib-
erty following arrest, the court went on to discuss, by way of dicta, the type of hearing
that is required in this regard. Concluding that adversary safeguards are not necessary,
the Court held that "the probable cause determination" is not a critical stage of the crim-
inal process such that counsel is needed. The Court distinguished this case from its de-
cisions in Coleman v. Alabama, supra note 83, and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (holding the lineup a critical stage): "To be sure, pretrial custody may af-
fect to some extent the suspect's ability to assist in the preparation of his defense, but
this does not present the high probability of harm identified as controlling in Wade and
Coleman." The four dissenting justices took issue with the majority's reasoning, and
admonished that more procedural protection had been granted in civil cases. They ex-
pressed concern that the majority had foreclosed any claim that the traditional require-
ments of due process are applicable to pretrial detention by basing their dicta on the
fourth amendment. In a footnote the majority answered this contention by stating that
the fourth amendment has always been thought to define the "process that is due" for
detention of persons pending trial as well as arrests and seizures. The case can be dis-
tinguished on the ground that the Court was not dealing with the "bail determination"
but with the "probable cause determination," under circumstances where bail had been
set. When directly faced with the question, the court may decide to modify its defini-
tion of a critical stage to include the bail hearing. The data presented in this article
and the results of the studies on the effect of pretrial detention indicate that it is critical
that the accused be afforded an adversary hearing and the assistance of counsel.
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The need for counsel at the bail-hearing stage becomes more evident
upon further analysis of the data. Some judges appear to set bail in wilfull
and biased disregard of the information proffered. This type of bias not only
constitutes an abuse of discretion and a violation of due process,86 but also
points up the crying need for counsel if a defendant is to successfully counter-
act this bias. In support of this argument, the following table indicates that
some judges actually use less information when an accused is interviewed by
the Bail Project than when he is not.
TABLE 8
AMOUNT OF INFORMATION USED BY INDIVIDUAL JUDGES
BP INTERVIEW v. No BP INTERVIEW-MAY, 1972, TO APRIL, 1973
JUDGE
Avg. Ant. Used87  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Yes BP .8 1.9 .9 No 4.3 3.1 1.4 0 .8
No BP .7 2.1 1.3 Data 3.0 3.0 2.6 1.4 1.2
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Yes BP 2.2 1.6 3.9 1.5 3.8 2.4 .5 1.9 .9
No BP 2.5 2.6 3.6 2.0 3.6 1.5 1.0 1.2 1.0
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Yes BP 2.3 .7 1.9 .8 5.0 1.7 0 3.8 2.6
No BP 2.0 1.4 1.5 .7 2.4 1.1 1.1 2.6 2.0
28 29 30 31
Yes BP .3 1.7 .8 3.0
No BP 1.3 1.2 1.0 .5
Those judges who do use less information where an accused has been
interviewed by the Bail Project do not, however, all view the Bail Project
information in the same light. While most of these judges wilfully refuse to
give credence to the Project information, some of them do take the informa-
tion seriously even though they do not actively use it. How a judge treats
the Project information can be determined by looking at his bond-setting be-
havior.
Certain judges who use less information in a case where the Bail Project
has interviewed the accused do give more ROR bonds in such a case.88 What
often happens is that the attorney for the Bail Project recommends that the
court release an accused on his own recognizance based upon the verified
information that the Project has obtained. The judge follows this recom-
mendation without inquiring as to the nature of the information. He accepts
the Project information, but he does not actively use it.
86. See note 49 supra.
87. See note 67 supra.
88. This is the case for judges 3, 10, 11, 16, 18. See Table 3 suprq.
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Certain other judges who use less information when the accused is inter-
viewed by the Bail Project give fewer ROR bonds in such cases.89 This type
of action is clearly biased activity, to the detriment of the accused who is
interviewed by the Project. It shows an outright refusal on the part of these
judges to make a meaningful bail decision and deprives the accused of an
opportunity to be heard. It is these judges who show an abuse of discretion
in violation of legislative policy and due process. The manner in which they
administer the bail right makes it necessary for the accused to have the as-
sistance of counsel to insure that he receives a due process hearing and does
not receive an oppressive bond.
PROCEDURES AVAILABLE To OBTAIN RELIEF
Action must be taken to question the bail that has been set. Such ac-
tion must be made in a timely manner, before the issue has been rendered
moot. The issue cannot be raised after conviction unless the conviction is
affected by the decision90-for example, when the defendant is deprived of
the opportunity to prepare for trial.
The Illinois statute provides the defendant with an early opportunity to
question the bail that has been set. The defendant may make a motion for
reduction of bail in the weekday court to which his case is assigned when
he appears for his first hearing. Section 110-6 of the Bail Article allows the
state or the defendant to make a motion for increase or reduction of bail in
the court before which the proceeding is pending. If this action proves fu-
tile, the resulting order is appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
604(c). 9 1
If the defendant is incarcerated, he may apply for a writ of habeas
corpus. An order denying bond or setting bond in an unreasonable amount
may be reviewed by habeas corpus in Illinois, 92 but the consideration will
be limited to the issue of the denial or setting of bond in relation to the of-
fense charged. 93
Additional remedies are available to the defendant at the federal level.
The federal statute provides that federal courts may grant habeas corpus re-
lief to state "prisoners" on the issue of bail provided certain requirements
have been met. The accused must allege that he is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.94 The accused
89. This is the case for judges 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 20, 25, 28 and 30. See Table 3
supra.
90. People v. Harris, 38 Ill. 2d 552, 555, 232 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1967).
91. Although the appeals procedure was designed with a view towards speedy re-
view, those experienced with the process indicate that it has not served this function in
practice. As a result, appeal of the bail decision is discouraged.
92. People ex rel. St. George v. Woods, 47 Ill. 2d 261, 263, 265 N.E.2d 164, 166
(1970).
93. Id. at 263, 265 N.E.2d at 166.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1970).
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must have exhausted state remedies, unless there is an absence of available
state correction procedures, or the existing circumstances render such process
ineffective. 95  The court must hold that there has not been an exhaustion
of state rememdies if the accused has the right under state law to raise the
questions by any available procedure.96 Federal courts will not disturb the
decision of a state court unless it is beyond the range within which judgments
could rationally differ.97
In summary, procedures are available both at the state and the federal
level -to enable the defendant to obtain review of the bail decision. The ac-
cused must first exhaust his state remedies. If satisfactory relief is not ob-
tained, and he is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution,
he may then apply for relief in a federal court.
CONCLUSION
Holiday court is, for many, a preliminary entrance into the criminal jus-
tice system in this country. It is a means devised to insure that one accused
of a crime is promptly brought before a judicial officer to determine whether
he should be released pending trial. Under the Illinois Constitution and stat-
ute, an accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right, with few exceptions.
This right is firmly grounded in our system of jurisprudence since it has long
been recognized in this country that being accused of a crime does not in
itself justify detention prior to trial. A person charged with a crime is pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty at trial. The right to bail exists as an
attempt to give meaning to this presumption and to prevent undue restraints
on liberty. As is the case with other rights, release prior to trial is not ab-
solute-the interest of the state in having the accused appear for trial must
also be considered. The purpose of bail-to secure the appearance of the
accused-reflects these two interests.
In practice, the right to bail has not been administered with the same
reverence that history has accorded it. This article has presented a legal
analysis of the bond-setting behavior of holiday court judges in Chicago.
The data has shown that many judges are neither acting in accordance with
the policies expressed by the legislature nor in accordance with constitutional
mandates. In most cases the defendant does not have the assistance of in-
dividual counsel. As a result, the defendant is not afforded a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, bail decisions are made -arbitrarily, and excessive
bond is set.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1970).
97. Bowring v. Cox, 334 F. Supp. 334, 336 (W.D. Va. 1971). For examples of
local cases where state prisoners have applied for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal
court, see United States ex rel. Kane v. Bensinger, 359 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
NOTES AND COMMENTS ii
Action must be taken to change the manner in which the bail right is
administered to insure a system responsive -to the rights of the individuals who
encounter that system. Procedures for reviewing the bail decision are avail-
able in both the state and the federal courts, but they are often ineffective
in providing the immediate relief that is needed. Steps must be taken to in-
sure that speedy review of the bail decision can be obtained. Reviewing
courts must issue clear directives to the lower courts on the manner in which
the bail right should be administered, if a movement towards the implementa-
tion of legislative intent and constitutional guarantees is to be initiated.
Other than the taking of a person's life, no deprivation is more extreme
than the taking of a person's liberty. With the stakes so high, the accused
should be afforded a full, adversary hearing and the asssistance of counsel.
The failure to assure the defendants these safeguards may result in loss of
respect for our legal system. Without that respect, the system cannot survive.
DEBORAH A. SPERLAK
